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Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) were one of the largest and fastest growing segments of the
structured finance market, fueling the 2003-2007 boom in syndicated loans and leveraged buyouts.
The credit crisis brought CLO issuance to a halt, and as a result the leveraged loan market dried up.
Similar to other structured finance products, investors in CLOs rely heavily on credit rating provided
by the rating agencies, yet little is known about CLO rating practices. This paper attempts to fill that
gap. Using novel hand-collected data on 3,912 tranches of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO)
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1.  Introduction  
Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) are Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
backed predominantly by loans. CLOs played a key role in financing billions of dollars of private 
equity firms’ leveraged buyouts around the world.  As of 2006, Standard & Poor’s Loan 
Syndications and Trading Association (S&P LSTA) estimated that structured investment 
vehicles like CLOs represented 60% of institutional participation in the syndicated loan market.  
The influx of capital from these investment vehicles was so extraordinary that the amount of 
capital committed to private equity in 2006 and 2007 reached record levels, surpassing the 
leverage buyout wave of the late 1980s (Kaplan and Stromberg (2008)).  However, following the 
subprime mortgage crisis, investors lost confidence in structured finance credit ratings and CLO 
issuance virtually dried up.  CLO issuance in the first quarter of 2008 was down 85% from the 
previous year’s level.
3  Leveraged loan originations followed suit, falling 74% in the first quarter 
of 2008 compared to same period in 2007.  Leverage buyout (LBO) lending slowed down to a 
near standstill in 2008 with issuance levels being the lowest in almost a decade.  The rise and fall 
(and potential resurrection) of the CLO market has important implications for private equity and 
leveraged loans lending. 
One important aspect of structured finance markets in general, and of the CLO market in 
particular, is the extent to which investor demand is driven by credit ratings.  CDOs contain 
hundreds of underlying assets and modeling the payoffs to these securities requires sophisticated 
cash flow models.  Investors rely on credit ratings as a focal point, yet there is little public 
information on how these ratings are calculated, and how ratings on CDO securities relate to the 
underlying collateral quality.  While there is a growing body of literature that studies the credit 
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ratings of residential-mortgage backed securities and CDOs,
4 less is known about the credit 
ratings of CLOs. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by studying the relation between CLO credit 
ratings and the quality of the underlying collateral backing these securities. Using novel hand-
collected data on 3,912 tranches of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) we document the 
structure of CLO tranches and the credit quality of the underlying collateral supporting these 
tranches.  
Collateralized Loan Obligations are interesting for several reasons.  CLOs are the second 
largest segment of the CDO market, accounting for 30% of the dollar volume of securities 
issued.
5  While CLOs have not yet suffered downgrades or impairments as dramatic as those 
experienced by asset-backed CDOs and mortgage-backed securities, there is concern that the 
deepening recession may lead to deterioration in the credit quality of CLOs portfolios.  We 
provide detailed information on underlying structures of CLOs to further the understanding of 
these securities, their structures, and credit ratings.  
Similar to other structured finance products, a large fraction of the securities issued by 
CLOs are AAA rated. 70.7% of the value of securities issued by CLOs in our sample is rated 
AAA.  Excluding unrated equity tranches, AAA tranches account for 79.2% of the dollar value 
of securities issued. In contrast to mortgage-backed securities, the assets in the collateral pools of 
CLOs are rated on the same scale as the liabilities, which facilitates an examination of the credit 
enhancement achieved through structuring. There is a large gap between the rating of CLO 
tranches and the credit quality of the underlying assets supporting these tranches. We find that 
85% of the CLOs in our sample have collateral pools with a weighted average credit rating of B, 
8% have a weighted average credit rating of BB, and for 7% the information is missing. We use 
                                                           
4 See for example, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008), Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2008a) Coval, Jurek, and Stafford 
(2008b), and Mason and Rosner (2007).  
 
5 Between 2005-2008, only structured finance CDOs (CDOs backed by structured securities like RMBS, ABS, other 
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the term “alchemy” to describe the mismatch between the credit ratings of CLO securities and 
the credit quality of the underlying collateral. We also document a large degree of uniformity 
among cash-flow CLOs; 63% of the CLOs in our sample had one of four major liability 
structures or deal types. Moreover, there is very little variation in the required composition of the 
collateral pools in the CLOs. We speculate that the uniformity of CLO structures is driven by a 
boiler-plate model that was used to rate CLOs targeting the highest possible credit rating at the 
lowest cost, while catering to investor demand.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we describe the market for 
CDOs, presenting statistics on global issuance and the economic motivation for CDO issuance.  
Section 3 describes our data.  Section 4 presents our empirical analysis of the structure of CDOs 
and their credit ratings.   Section 5 discusses the demand for highly rated structured products 
tranches. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Market for Collateralized Debt Obligations 
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are special-purpose vehicles that buy portfolios of 
assets and issue securities backed by the cash flows from those assets. The collateral assets, in 
turn, are sold to a special-purpose entity, often located in the Cayman Islands or Ireland, to 
ensure bankruptcy remoteness from the issuer. While the first CDOs were created in the 1980s, 
global issuance remained low, under $100 billion annually, until the mid-1990s.
6 Since 2002, 
CDOs have been the fastest growing sector of the asset-backed securities market. 
 
2.1. The Economics of CDOs 
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The defining feature of CDOs and CLOs is their multi-tiered liability structure (see 
Figure 1). CDOs and CLOs issue multiple classes of financial claims with differing levels of 
seniority against diversified pool of assets.  When assets in the collateral pool miss payments or 
default, subordinate tranches absorb losses first. More senior tranches only suffer losses once the 
cushion below them has been depleted. 
The process of pooling of assets achieves diversification as long as the assets are not 
perfectly correlated, while structuring of tranches with different levels of seniority reallocates 
risk across different securities. In a Modigliani-Miller world with perfect markets, there would 
be no benefit to this kind of repackaging by tranching, however in the presence of various market 
imperfections, gains from tranching may exist. DeMarzo (2005) lists three types of market 
frictions that are important in explaining securitization: (i) transactions costs, (ii) market 
incompleteness, and (iii) asymmetric information. According to DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and 
DeMarzo (2005), asymmetric information plays a key role in explaining the existence of 
tranched securities.  DeMarzo (2005) notes that market incompleteness cannot explain the 
existence of pass-through pools or most CLOs because they do not augment the span of tradeable 
claims; additionally, transactions costs explain why pooling is valuable but not tranching.   
DeMarzo (2005) presents a model of a financial intermediary that would like to sell assets about 
which it has superior information.  When the number of assets is large and their returns are 
imperfectly correlated, the intermediary maximizes his revenue from the sale by pooling and 
tranching, as opposed to simply pooling or selling the assets individually.  Similar to the intuition 
in Myers and Majluf (1984), tranching allows the intermediary to concentrate the default risk in 
one part of the capital structure, resulting in a large share of the liabilities being almost riskless 
which in turn reduces the overall lemons discount that buyers demand.  In order to create a large 
share of safe securities from a pool of very risky assets the issuer of a typical CLO needs to Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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enhance the creditworthiness of the most senior tranches of the deal. We illustrate the credit 
enhancement mechanisms in CLOs using a representative deal in the next subsection.   
 
2.2 CLO Structure and Credit Enhancement: A Representative Deal 
Table 1 illustrates the sources of credit enhancement in CLOs and the transformation of 
B-rated loans into AAA securities using a representative deal from our sample, Octagon 
Investment Partners V Ltd.  Octagon Investment Partners V was a $300 million deal that closed 
on January 14, 2003, with a portfolio consists primarily of non-investment grade loans as well as 
a limited amount of high-yield bonds and structured finance securities.
7   The weighted average 
rating of the underlying collateral is BB-.  The CLO financed the purchase of these assets with a 
mix of tranched liabilities: out of which 79% is AAA, 7% A, 5% BBB, 2% BB, and 8% unrated. 
There are several sources of credit enhancement in CLO structures, which support the 
creation of investment grade claims backed by speculative grade assets:  (a) diversification (b) 
overcollateralization and subordination (c) excess spread, and (d) the active management of the 
pool.  The collateral guidelines of Octagon V indicate that the manager must maintain a 
minimum level of diversification in his portfolio. The maximum allowable concentration in 
securities from a single issuer is 2% ($6 million).
8 When losses do occur, investors in the higher-
rated tranches are insulated from loss by the tranches subordinate to them.  All of the rated 
noteholders benefit from the ‘overcollateralization’ provided by the equity tranche.  Octagon V 
purchased assets with an aggregate principal balance of $300 million, issuing $276.75 million 
worth of rated notes.  The difference, $23.25 million (8%) of the asset purchase, was financed by 
equity investors in the deal, who receive payments from interest and principal cash flows only 
                                                           
7 Although 50% of deals in our sample were issued between 2004 and 2006, we describe a deal from 2003 because 
information about the spread on assets in the CLO portfolio is largely missing from S&P reports after 2003.   
8 Many deals also limit concentration within an industry to 8-12% of the portfolio, although this deal does not have 
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after rated noteholders have been paid.  Additionally, investors in the senior tranches of Octagon 
V are protected from loss by the mezzanine tranches of the deal. In Octagon V, 21% of the 
capital structure serves as a cushion against loss for those investors.   
In cash-flow CLOs, subordination is achieved by distributing cash flows from the assets 
to investors in order of seniority.  Panels C and D of Table 1 show the ‘waterfalls’ that govern 
how interest and principal cash flows from the collateral are allocated to investors in the deal.   
After taxes and administrative fees have been paid, interest receipts are used to pay CLO 
investors in the most senior class, A.  As long as par coverage and interest coverage ratios meet 
their required levels (specified in the CLO indenture), interest flows down the capital structure to 
the next most senior class, B.
9 If the ratios are not met, proceeds must be used to pay down class 
A, and restore compliance before subordinate investors receive any payments. Preferred 
shareholders collect the residual interest after all the classes senior to them have been paid.  In 
Octagon V, the manager has an incentive to make sure that the equityholders will receive a 
minimum IRR of 14% because his incentive fee is conditional on it.
10  
Another source of credit enhancement is excess spread.  The weighted average spread on 
a CLO’s assets typically exceeds the weighted average spread on its liabilities.  In Octagon V, 
the weighted average spread on the assets expected at the time the portfolio is fully ramped is 
3.125%
11 (Table 1, Panel E) while the weighted average spread on its liabilities is 87 basis points 
(Table 1, Panel A).  Expected excess spread at the time of deal close is 2.26%.  The deal requires 
the manager to maintain a minimum weighted average spread on assets of 2.75%, or excess 
spread of at least 1.88%. Octagon V, like most CLOs, is a revolving deal.  The notes issued by 
                                                           
9 Par coverage for a class = [total par of collateral assets + cash + defaulted securities at lower of MV or recovery] / 
[par  value of securities outstanding in class & all classes senior];  Interest coverage for a class = [interest received 
during period + net swap payments]/[total amount of interest payable on the tranche] 
10 Not all structures have this feature.  Another common setup is, after the interest-paying classes have been paid, the 
manager takes 50% of the residual as an incentive fee and the rest goes to equity. 
11 This calculation assumes 100% of the portfolio assets are floating rate for simplicity, although 10% of the 
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the CLO mature in November 2014.  For the first five years of the deal (the ‘reinvestment 
period’), the manager may use principal proceeds to reinvest in additional assets; after the 
reinvestment period, proceeds must be used to pay down notes.  During the reinvestment period, 
the manager may also engage in limited trading, under certain conditions (Table 1, Panel F).  
Octagon V’s manager can trade assets that decline or improve in credit quality and may also 
make discretionary sales, as long as those sales do not exceed 25% of the aggregate principal 
balance of the portfolio.
12  After sales and purchases, the issuer must run Standard & Poor’s 
CDO Monitor to confirm that the portfolio satisfies coverage tests (overcollateralization and 
interest coverage limits by tranche) and collateral quality tests (portfolio concentration limits, 
weighted average spread tests, etc).  If, at any point, overcollateralization or interest coverage 
tests are not satisfied, investors in the rated notes may force redemption in order of seniority.   
Octagon V also provides the issuer with the option to redeem the notes in full after a three-year 
non-call period, subject to the approval of more than 50% of the preferred shareholders  
 
2.3. Collateralized Debt Obligation Types and Issuer Motivation 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on global issuance of al types of CDOs for the period 2004-
2008.
13 Issuance is broken down by type of structure and by issuer motivation. There are three 
main types of CDO structures: (i) cash-flow, (ii) synthetic, and (iii) market-value.  Cash-flow 
structures are the most common (74%), with synthetic (14%) and market-value (10%) structures 
accounting for a much smaller share of issuance.  A cash-flow CDO issues notes to investors 
and uses the proceeds to invest in primary financial assets such as loans, mortgages, bonds, etc.  
As interest and principal are generated by the underlying collateral, proceeds are distributed to 
                                                           
12 A 25% limit for discretionary sales is relatively high; most CLOs limit this to 10-15% of the aggregate principal 
balance. 
13 The information in Table 2 is reproduction of data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA) and Thomson Financial reports. Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
  9
the CDO investors in a pre-specified way, in order of seniority.  In contrast, synthetic CDOs 
obtain their credit exposure through derivatives contracts instead of assets purchases.  A 
synthetic CDO issues notes to investors, invests the proceeds in risk-free securities, and enters 
into a series of credit default swaps (selling protection).  Investors in a synthetic CDO receive 
periodic payments from swap premiums, and their principal is written down if the reference 
entities on the swaps default.
14 Market-value CDOs account for a growing share of the market.  
They are similar to cash-flow CDOs except the amount of liabilities the CDO can issue is 
determined by advance rates for each asset in the pool and collateral is marked-to-market 
frequently. When the liabilities outstanding exceed the advance rates, the manager must sell 
collateral and pay down notes until compliance is restored. While cash-flow CDOs can alter the 
credits in their collateral pools, trading is less frequent in cash-flow CDOs than in a market-
value CDO.
15   
Table 2 also decomposes CDO issuance by issuer motivation. 86 percent of CDOs issued 
from 2004 through the first half of 2008 were arbitrage-motivated, rather than balance-sheet 
motivated.  Arbitrage CDOs are typically sponsored by an investment manager or hedge fund 
that acquires assets on the open market and packages them into a CDO to earn management fees 
on the deal.  Balance-sheet CDOs are motivated by a financial institution’s desire to achieve 
relief from regulatory capital requirements or to free up capital for lending.  Balance-sheet 
issuers are typically lending institutions.  The arbitrage versus balance-sheet label is provided to 
Thomson Financial by the underwriter.  We were unable to get any further details from Thomson 
about how the distinction is made, but an examination of the transactions labeled as balance-
                                                           
14 In contrast, investors in an unfunded synthetic CDO do not make any upfront payments.  The CDO enters into 
default swaps and investors are required to post funds on-demand when reference entities default. 
15 Most managed cash-flow CDOs limit trading to certain types of securities (e.g. – defaulted securities, credit-risk 
securities for which the mark has widened by 100bp) and/or limit discretionary trading to 10-20% over the life of the 
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sheet deals by S&P reveals that these transactions typically contain assets from a single 
originator.  
 
3. Data and Sample Construction  
Collateralized Loan Obligations are largely sold in private markets (registered under 144A or 
Reg S), hence data on their structures is not publicly available. The SDC Platinum New Issues 
database tracks issuance in these markets but assembling a sample of CDOs from these data is 
difficult due to inconsistencies in SDC’s classification of CDOs.
16 Moreover, SDC Platinum only 
provides information on the liability side of the CDO (the notes that have been issued), but does 
not contain detailed information about the underlying collateral that supports the notes.  
 
3.1. Sample Construction 
We construct our sample of CLOs using Standard & Poor’s RatingsDirect database, by 
hand-collecting micro-level data on the structure of a large sample of CLOs.  The S&P data 
allows us to observe both the asset side and the liability side of a CLO, in addition to a host of 
information about the ratings decision.  RatingsDirect provides real-time access to S&P’s credit 
research and ratings for currently-rated fixed income securities. At the time we gathered the data, 
October 2007, the database contained 3,237 CLOs (1,704 cash-flow, 970 synthetic, and 563 
market-value or hybrids).  We focus on cash-flow CLOs for which the collateral is primarily 
corporate loans. There are 744 such transactions in the database, comprising 44% of cash-flow 
CLOs and 23% of all CLOs by number.  This is the largest single category of CDO in Ratings 
Direct, by number.   
                                                           
16 For example, SDC alternatively labels CDO tranches as floating rate notes, collateral bonds, preferred shares, and 
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Figure 2 plots issuance volume by year for our sample, while Table 2 reports the 
corresponding numbers for Figure 2.   Our sample contains 531 cash-flow CLOs that were issued 
between 2000 and the third quarter of 2007.
17  The phenomenal growth of the CDO market is 
reflected in this segment of the market that we observe.  From 2004 to 2006, the par value of 
issuance increased by about 75% annually.  While the year 2007 was on track to surpass the 
record issuance numbers of 2006, the credit crisis brought CDO and CLO issuance to a complete 
halt.  The small number of CLOs in our sample issued between 2000 and 2002 is due to the 
nature of the database.  RatingsDirect drops securities that are not currently rated.  Most cash-
flow CLOs can be called or redeemed by the issuer after a five to seven year non-call period 
(subject to the approval of a majority of preferred shareholders), and it is likely that many issued 
in the early part of the window have been.  Our results do not change if we exclude these CLOs 
from the analysis.  Additionally, since the non-call period is typically at least five years, we have 
no reason to suspect that the CLOs in our sample that were issued post-2002 are subject to any 
selection bias.  As Table 2 demonstrates, the majority of CLOs – 72% by amount, 75% by 
number over the whole period – are US-dollar denominated.  Issuance of Euro-denominated 
CLOs increased over time from 20% of the dollar volume of issuance in 2002 to 36% in the first 
three quarters of 2007.    
Figure 3 and Table 3 provide a detailed description of CLO deal structures.  The average 
CLO in our sample has 7.3 tranches but deals range from 2 tranches to 21 tranches. Average deal 
sizes and tranche sizes have risen over time. In 2002, the median CLO issued securities totaling 
$397 million; by 2007, the median deal was $500 million. In 2002, the median tranche size was 
$17 million while, in 2007, the median tranche size was $35 million.
18   
                                                           
17 We get our descriptive data from S&P analyst reports, which were only available for 534/744 cash-flow CLOs.  
Reports for three of these CDOs were missing critical information hence the CDO sample size of 531. 
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For each CLO, we gather data from two sources in RatingsDirect: (i) an analyst report, 
Presale report or New Issue report, and (ii) Current Ratings reports.  Around the time a 
transaction closes, S&P releases the Presale report or New Issue report: an analyst report 
summarizing the rating decision and the deal structure. We supplement the information from the 
Presale Report with data from the Current Ratings report. We also record the tranche structure in 
the Current rating report and check it against the structure in the analyst report. 
Presale Reports are typically released two to three days before the expected closing date 
of a transaction. New Issue Reports appear anytime from one day to one year after a transaction 
has closed (the median is 73 days after).  At least one of these reports is available for 534 of the 
744 cash-flow CLOs in Ratings Direct. We hand-collected data from these reports, using the 
New Issue Report when available, otherwise the Presale Report.  One concern about Presale 
reports is that they are issued prior to issue date, and may not reflect the actual collateral pool or 
the deal structure. To address this concern, we use the Current Ratings report, which has up-to-
date information on tranche structures and ratings, to check whether actual deal structures match 
the ones in the Presale reports.  In 405 out of 534 CLOs (75.8%), the tranche structures are 
similar across the two reports alleviating concerns about the accuracy of Presale reports.
19   
 
4. The Credit Ratings of CLOs  
4.1. Credit-Rating Arbitrage and the Uniformity of CLO Structures 
Managers of cash-flow arbitrage CDOs make money by buying assets such as loans in secondary 
markets, refinancing them by issuing tranches that are secured by these assets, and taking a share 
of the profits. Part of the cost-of-capital advantage that CLOs enjoy is due to their legal status as 
                                                           
19If any back-and-forth occurs between CLO arrangers and the rating agency it probably happens before any analyst 
reports are issued. .However, it is unlikely that such negotiations are necessary.  S&P’s CDO Evaluator software is 
distributed freely to arrangers so they know, for the most part (the rating agency may raise concerns that are outside 
the scope of the model, e.g., about the manager’s track record), how changing the structure changes the amount of 
each class of rated notes that can be supported before the rating committee’s review begins.   Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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special-purpose entities,
20 but most of it is the result of structuring, which produces highly-rated 
securities.  As their name suggests, cash-flow arbitrage CLOs exploit credit-rating arbitrage; in 
the process of pooling and tranching, low-rated securities are transformed into highly rated 
tranches.  
Table 4 and Figure 4 decompose the par value of notes issued by credit rating.  In the 
sample as a whole, 71% of issuance is rated AAA; 5% is AA, 6% is A, 5% is BBB, 2% is BB, 
0.1% is B and 11% is NR (unrated).  The composition of issuance across years is almost 
identical to the overall composition with a slight downward trend in the amount of AAA and an 
upward trend in the amount of unrated tranches over time. Table 5 presents a more detailed 
analysis of deal structures.  We find that every CLO except one has an AAA tranche, and the 
median AAA tranche represents 73% of the deal’s total value. Likewise, 98% of CLOs have an 
unrated tranche and the median tranche, conditional on having one, comprises 8.8% of the deal.  
The interquartile ranges show that there is little variation in the composition of rated tranches 
across deals.  For example, 80% of CDOs have a AA tranche and the median AA tranche 
represents 6% of the deal’s par value.  The interquartile range for the size of AA tranches is 
[4.7%, 7.7%].  Issuing liabilities in notched rating classes (e.g., AA+ or AA-) is relatively 
uncommon for every rating letter category.   We also document a large degree of uniformity 
among cash-flow CDOs. According to Panel A of Table 6, 63% of the CDOs in our sample had 
one of four major liability structures (“deal types”):  40% are {AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, NR} 
deals; 13% are {AAA, AA, A, BBB, NR}; 7% are {AAA, AA, A, BBB-, BB-, NR}; 4% are 
{AAA, A, BBB, BB, NR}.
21  The remaining 137 deals have idiosyncratic structures that appear 
less than 20 times each.   
                                                           
20 Not subject to capital requirements like most financial institutions and located in low-tax jurisdictions. 
21 These results do not distinguish between deals that have 1 tranche per rating class or multiple tranches per rating 
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4.2. The Uniformity of Collateral Restrictions 
The majority of the CLOs in our sample are managed, that is collateral managers can 
engage in limited trading over the designated ‘reinvestment period’, typically the first 5-7 years 
of a 12-year CDO.
22   In managed CLOs, the credit quality of the pool is controlled by covenants 
in the deal that constrain the manager’s asset allocation. Table 7 summarizes the frequency and 
nature of collateral composition restrictions in our sample. These restrictions fall into a few 
broad categories: (1) Restrictions on asset type, (2) Restrictions on the fraction of near-default 
securities in the pool, (3) Restrictions on the mix of fixed/floating rate securities and the payment 
frequency of the collateral, (4) Diversification requirements by industry and issuer, (5) Currency 
and domicile restrictions on collateral, (6) Rating restrictions. 
Conditioning on the presence of any given restriction, there is very little variation in the 
magnitude of the restriction.  For example, nearly 70% of the CDOs in our sample require a 
minimum fraction of the collateral pool be invested in senior secured loans. When this restriction 
is present, in 40% of the cases it takes the value of 90%, and the interquartile range is [85%, 
90%].  Furthermore, 46% of CDOs restrict the amount of second lien loans as a percentage of 
total asset par; the median limit is 10% and the interquartile range is [10%, 12.5%]. Likewise, 
60% of CDOs limit the amount of structured finance collateral as a percent of total asset par; the 
median limit is 5% and the interquartile range is [3%, 5%].  We find similar clustering on all 
other types of restrictions.  According to S&P, collateral constraints “are specified by the 
sponsor, banker, and collateral manager based on their perceptions of what the investor 
community wants and can be comfortable with” (Global Cash Flow & Synthetic CDO Criteria, 
p. 19-21).  In the rating process, and as ratings are monitored during the life of the CDO, 
collateral restrictions only affect tranche ratings insofar as default, correlation, and recovery rates 
                                                           
22 Typically 10-15% of the par value of assets may be traded per year in addition to securities defaulted securities or 
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assumed for individual assets depend on asset class, rating, maturity, and domicile.  (We explain 
the details of the rating model in Section 5.1).  That is, there is no additional penalty vis-à-vis the 
rating agencies for including for example more than 5% of structured finance collateral.  The 
uniformity in collateral restrictions suggests that investors may to some extent rely on simple 
rules to judge the riskiness of these complex and idiosyncratic structures.  Additionally, there is 
reason to believe that rating agencies influence investor perceptions of what constitutes an 
acceptable allocation of collateral.   S&P’s Presale and New Issue reports have a ‘Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Concerns’ section where they highlight collateral characteristics that they deem 
unusually risky;  often this involves pointing out when allocations to certain baskets (e.g., rated 
below CCC+, structure finance securities, etc)  exceed levels seen in Table 7. 
 
4.3. The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings  
We now turn to analyze the relation between the underlying collateral quality, and the 
credit rating of the secured tranches. Our main measure of collateral quality is the weighted 
average rating (WAR) of all the assets in the pool. The WAR is reported in the Presale reports 
and is calculated as a weighted-average of all the loans, bonds and securities in the collateral 
pool. S&P requires that every asset in the pool will have either an actual or assessed credit rating.  
One concern about weighted-average rating as a measure of collateral quality is that it does not 
sufficiently describe the riskiness of the collateral pools.  Two portfolios with the same WAR 
could have very different loss distributions.  Consider, for example, a portfolio that contains only 
B-rated securities versus a portfolio that contains some AA securities pooled together with many 
CCC-rated securities or near-default loans.  However, based on the collateral restrictions we Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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observe, it seems likely that most of the collateral in a CDO with a WAR of B is probably, in 
fact, B-rated.
23    
We find that 85% of the CLOs in our sample have collateral pools with a WAR of B, 8% 
have a WAR of BB, and for 7% the information about WAR is missing.
24 As Panel B of Table 6 
demonstrates, we do not find any correlation between deal type and WAR of the collateral pool; 
each type of deal is more likely to be backed by collateral with an average rating of B than BB. It 
is interesting to note that there is a trend in weighted-average collateral quality over time: with 
BB-backed CDOs all but disappearing by 2006-2007. This deterioration in average collateral 
quality over time implies that debt or equity investments in later CDOs are potentially riskier.   
As is typical in structured finance products, there is a gap between the credit ratings on 
the notes issued by CDOs and the credit quality of the underlying collateral. Figure 5 quantifies 
the ratings transformation that takes place in our sample of CDOs. Cash-flow CLOs finance the 
purchase of junk-rated assets (typically B+) largely with AAA-rated borrowings. While 70.7% of 
the dollar amount of CDOs in our sample was initially rated as AAA, the collateral that supports 
these issues had an average credit rating of B+. 
 
4.4. How Does the CLO Credit Rating Model Work? 
In this subsection we review the process that S&P uses to determine credit ratings for CLO 
tranches.  The rating process for cash-flow CLOs involves two steps.  In the first stage, an 
expected loss distribution for the underlying collateral pool is estimated. In the second stage, 
cash flow simulations are used to determine whether a tranche can withstand the necessary level 
of defaults to earn a given rating.  The model requires many assumptions about default 
                                                           
23 Sixty percent of CDOs restrict the amount of collateral that can be rated CCC+ or lower to five to seven percent of 
the portfolio. 
24 These are compressed ratings.  The full WAR distribution is:  0.2% BBB-,  0.6% BB+, 0.4 BB, 7% BB-, 65%  
B+, 16%  B, 4% B-, 0.2% CCC+, 7% missing data. Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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probabilities, correlation, interest rate movements, and more.  The model generates two key 
statistics that determine the level of credit enhancement of each of the tranches in a CLO deal. 
The first statistic, calculated for each tranche, is S&P’s ‘scenario default rate’ (SDR).  The 
‘scenario default rate’ is the level of default in the collateral pool that a tranche must be able to 
withstand to earn its rating.  SDRs allow us to characterize, at least partially, the loss distribution 
that was estimated in the rating process for each collateral pool. The second statistic – ‘break-
even default rate’ (BEDR) indicates the level of portfolio defaults that each tranche can 
withstand, according to the underwriter’s cash-flow models 
To estimate an expected loss distribution for a CLO’s collateral, S&P uses historical data 
on rating transitions from its CreditPro database (1981-present).
25 Each asset in the collateral 
pool is assigned an expected default probability based on asset class (corporates, ABS, 
sovereigns, etc), rating, and maturity.
26  Some simple assumptions are made about default 
correlation. For example, two corporate securities in the same sector are assigned a 0.15 
correlation; while corporate securities from different sectors obtain a correlation of 0.05.
27  
Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate the distribution of portfolio losses. S&P then uses 
this loss distribution to generate a “scenario default rate” (SDR) for each tranche – this is the 
level of portfolio losses that a tranche must be able to withstand in cash flow simulations to earn 
its rating.
28 There are two steps in calculating the SDR. First, S&P identifies the default rate on 
                                                           
25 Calculations may be based on the expected composition of the asset pool to some extent because only 50-70% is 
typically ramped up at the closing date. 
26 According to the CDO Evaluator Technical Document, p. 5-6, S&P calculates a one-year transition matrix from 
historical data and generates predicted default rates by raising it to higher powers.  Appendix 1 of this document 
shows the one-year transition matrix and the predicted default rates (up to 30yrs).  This methodology implicitly 
assumes that current rating is the only determinant of the likelihood of default. 
27 Standard & Poor’s “CDO Evaluator 3.0: Technical Document”, p.22.  This document describes version 3.0 of the 
CDO Evaluator Model which was released in December 2005.  In previous versions, correlation assumptions for 
corporates were 0.30 within industry and 0.00 across industries (Standard & Poor’s “Global Cash Flow and 
Synthetic CDO Criteria, p. 46 and Standard & Poor’s “S&P Launches Latest Version of CDO Evaluator Modeling 
Tool”, p. 2).  
28 According to S&P “withstand” means to pay timely interest and ultimate principal by the final legal maturity of 
the notes.    Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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corporate bonds that have the same rating as the one being sought for the tranche and maturity 
equal to the weighted-average maturity of the CDO’s assets (“x%”).
  Then, using the loss 
distribution generated for the collateral pool, they identify the default rate that has no greater 
chance of being exceeded than x%; this is the SDR.   
Consider a CDO tranche backed by collateral with a weighted-average maturity of 10 
years that is being tested for an A rating.  If the expected default rate of a 10-year A-rated 
corporate bond is 3%, the SDR for the tranche is set equal to the level of default in the CDO’s 
collateral pool that has no greater than 3% chance of being exceeded.  When the underwriter runs 
cash-flow simulations, he will test that the tranche can withstand cumulative defaults up to the 
SDR without missing interest or final principal payments.  The logic is “if the tranche can 
survive defaults up to the SDR then its probability of default is no greater than 3%, as would be 
appropriate for an A rating” (Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria, p. 42).    
SDRs allow us to back out, partially, the loss distributions that were estimated for each 
CLO’s collateral pool.  For example, the loss distribution for a CLO backed by a pool of assets 
with a weighted average maturity of seven years must satisfy:
 29 
Pr(asset defaults as % of total par > SDRAAA)≤ default rate of 7 year, AAA-rated corporate bond =  0.14% 
Pr(asset defaults as % of total par > SDRAA) ≤ default rate of 7 year, AA-rated corporate bond  = 0.40% 
Pr(asset defaults as % of total par > SDRA) ≤ default rate of 7 year, A-rated corporate bond  = 0.96% 
Pr(asset defaults as % of total par > SDRBBB) ≤  default rate of 7 year, BBB-rated corporate bond  = 4.6% 
Pr(asset defaults as % of total par > SDRBB) ≤ default rate of 7 year, BB-rated corporate bond  = 14.1% 
Pr(asset defaults as % of total par > SDRB) ≤  default rate of 7 year, B-rated corporate bond  = 32.2% 
                                                           
29 Seven-year default rates were taken from the credit curves in Appendix 1 of “CDO Evaluator Version 3.0: 
Technical Document”, which are calculated by repeated application of a 1-yr transition matrix.   It is unclear 
whether these are the correct figures, because these default rates do not control for the maturity of the issue; 
however, we could not locate any other statistics on corporate bond default rates by maturity published by S&P.   
For a comparison, Moody’s default rates for corporate bonds with 7-year maturities are Aaa=0.31%, Aa=0.55%, 
A=0.78%, Baa=2.86%, Ba=15.32%, B=35.55% (Moody’s Default & Recovery of Corporate Bond Issuers) Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the loss distribution and SDRs. 
Table 8 summarizes SDRs by tranche rating for our sample.   As the table shows, median SDRs 
by rating class are:  AAA=41%, AA=37%, A=32%, BBB=26%, BB=20%. Assuming, for 
simplicity, that all CDOs have assets with a weighted-average maturity equal to the sample mean 
(7-years), the typical CDO in our sample is backed by collateral that has an expected loss 
distribution like the one below:  
Pr (defaults as % of total asset par> 41%) ≤ 0.14% 
Pr (defaults as % of total asset par>37%) ≤ 0.40% 
Pr (defaults as % of total asset par>32%) ≤ 0.96% 
 Pr (defaults as % of total asset par>26%) ≤ 4.6% 
Pr (defaults as % of total asset par>20%) ≤ 14.1% 
An AAA tranche is a tranche that can withstand the cumulative default rate that has no greater 
than 0.14% of being exceeded (41%).  An AA tranche is one that can withstand the cumulative 
default rate that has no greater than 0.40% of being exceeded (37%).  Clearly this methodology 
relies on estimating the loss distribution with a high degree of precision. Yet small changes in 
correlation assumptions can have dramatic effects on the right tail of the loss distribution.   
 
5. CLO Ratings and Investor Demand 
Similar to many other structured finance products, most of the liabilities of CLOs are AAA-
rated. In the previous section we described the credit rating model used to generate the supply of 
AAA tranches. In this section we suggest that to a large extent CDO structures - and in particular 
their AAA-rated tranches - are driven by investor demand, which in turn is potentially driven by 
rating-dependent regulation, asymmetric information, and investor guidelines and heuristics.  
 
5.1. Rating-dependent Regulation Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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Extensive use of credit ratings in the regulation of financial institutions created a natural clientele 
for CDO and CLO securities.  According to Hunt (2008), at least 44 SEC rules and forms 
incorporated agency ratings as of June 2008. Minimum capital requirements at banks, insurance 
companies, and broker-dealers, depend on the credit ratings of the assets on their balance 
sheets.
30  Pension funds, a $10 trillion source of capital in the United States, also face ratings-
based regulations.  A recent survey of two hundred pension plan sponsors and investment 
managers in the US and Europe (Cantor, Gwilym, and Thomas, 2007) found that 75% have 
minimum rating requirements for bond purchases and 50% set limits on portfolio distribution by 
rating class.  Meanwhile, modifications to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA) over the past twenty years have gradually expanded the range of structured 
finance securities that pension funds can hold.
31  This matrix of regulation creates institutional 
demand for highly-rated securities, yet the supply of highly-rated single-name securities is fairly 
limited.  For example, only five nonfinancial companies and a few sovereigns had AAA ratings 
as of 2007.  Thus, it is not surprising that highly rated CDO securities, especially those that are 
rated AAA, are attractive to many of these financial institutions. Highly-rated CDO securities 
incur smaller capital charges, may be used as collateral, and provide a higher yield than single-
name securities with the same rating. Moreover, private investors not subject to rating-based 
regulation, may develop internal investment rules using credit ratings as inputs even when not 
required by regulation to do so.   
 
5.2. Heuristics and Asymmetric Information 
                                                           
30 Basel II allows banks to choose between two methodologies for calculating capital requirements for credit risk.  
The standardized approach, a modification of Basel I, is credit-rating based.  The internal ratings based (IRB) 
approach allows banks us their internal estimates of risk components (e.g., expected default, loss given default, 
unexpected loss) to calculate the capital required for a given exposure. (http://www.bis.org/pubs/bcbs107b.pdf) 
31 In 1989, the Department of Labor began allowing ERISA plans to invest in highly-rated asset-backed securities 
with the passage of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 89-88. Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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Ratings-based regulation explains some of the demand for highly-rated securities, but does not 
fully  explain why we see so much AAA in CDO structures, as opposed to AA or A.  Behavioral 
economics provides some insight as to why investors might demand AAA securities even in the 
absence of rating-dependent regulation. As described above, according to DeMarzo (2005) under 
asymmetric information, a CLO issuer maximizes his revenue from the sale by pooling and 
tranching, which results in the concentration of the default risk in few tranches. According to 
Demarzo’s model, in order to alleviate any concerns about adverse selection in the securities 
issued by the CLO arranger, these securities would need to be certified as risk-. If investors use 
heuristics to classify assets, as in Barberis and Shleifer (2003), and only AAA-rated securities are 
perceived to be riskless then issuers would cater to investor demand by carving out large portions 
of their collateral pools as AAA. 
 
5.3. Investor Demand and the Supply of Uniform Securities  
While it is difficult to quantify the extent to which regulation, heuristics, or asymmetric 
information, individually drive demand for CLO securities, the uniformity of CLO structures 
suggests that investor demand in general is an important determinant of their structures. 
Uniformity reduces the amount of time investors must spend analyzing a new deal by making it 
easy to identify deviations from commonly used practices. If some CLO structures have been 
perceived as more desirable then other issuers will follow the same convention. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the S&P rating model was known to CLO issuers and was provided to 
them by the rating agency. Figure 7 displays excerpts from the CDO Evaluator Manual which we 
have downloaded from S&P’s website. The CDO Evaluator software enabled issuers to structure 
their CDOs to achieve the highest possible credit rating at the lowest possible cost. For example, 
Figure 7 shows that one of the outputs that the CDO Evaluator provides to the issuer is “excess Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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collateral” which, according to S&P, “tells what percentage of assets notional needs to be 
eliminated (added) in order for the transaction to provide just enough (i.e. ROC equals to 
100%) support at a given rating level.”
32  In other words, the model provided a sensitivity 
analysis feature that made it easy for issuers to target the highest possible credit rating at the 
lowest cost. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
The innovation represented by Collateralized Loan Obligations has been instrumental to the 
growth of the syndicated loan market. By creating highly-rated securities out of junk quality 
loans, CLOs have brought new investors into the loan market - rating-constrained institutions 
that would not be allowed to hold the non-investment grade loans directly – and helped to 
finance a record-breaking leveraged buyout wave from 2003 to 2007. While CLOs have not yet 
suffered downgrades or impairments as those experienced by asset-backed CDOs, there are some 
signs that the deepening recession is causing deterioration in the quality of outstanding loans that 
serve as collateral for CLOs. Table 9 displays collateral performance by vintage as been reported 
recently by S&P. As the Table demonstrates, the fraction of assets rated BB and B has declined, 
while the share of assets rated CCC or those in actual default (D) increased across most vintages. 
These changes reflect the transition of assets from BB and B ratings to CCC and D within CLOs’ 
collateral pools as a result of the current recession and credit crisis. While most of the effect of 
the decline in collateral quality led to downgrades of mezzanine tranches of CLOs rather than the 
most senior tranches, if this trend continues, more senior tranches may be affected as well.
33 The 
                                                           
32 See Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2008) who provide evidence that securitization led to loans with worse fundamentals 
due to the tendency to rely on statistical models and reduction in the incentives to collect soft information. 
33 CLO managers may be required to sell defaulted loans if they violate collateral quality requirements, however 
secondary markets for loans have dried up as well, which may result in loan fire-sales. Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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future of CLOs as well as the resurrection of the leveraged loan market will likely be determined 
by the ability of CLOs to withstand corporate defaults.  Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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Figure 2: CDO Issuance by Year 
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Figure 4: CDO rating Structure 
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Figure 5: CDO vs. Underlying Collateral Credit Ratings (3,912 tranches) 
This figure compares the credit rating of CDO tranches with the average credit rating of the underlying collateral 
pools that back them.  The height of the bars pertaining to the tranche ratings represents the total par value of CDO 
securities issued with a given rating.  The height of the bars pertaining to the underlying collateral represents the 
total par value of the CDOs where each CDO’s par value is allocated based on the weighted average rating of the 
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Table 1:  Payment Priority Structure for Octagon Investment Partners V Ltd. 
 
Panel A: Tranche Structure (CLO Liabilities) 
Class Rating  Original  Principal Balance  Interest Rate 
A  AAA  US$ 236,250,000  3-MONTH LIBOR + 60.00bp 
B  A  US$ 21,000,000  3-MONTH LIBOR + 175.00bp 
C  BBB  US$ 15,000,000  3-MONTH LIBOR + 300.00bp 
D  BB  US$ 4,500,000  3-MONTH LIBOR + 825.00bp 
Pref. shares  NR  US$ 23,250,000  Residual 
 
Panel B: Collateral Profile (CLO Assets) 
Weighted average rating  BB- 
Weighted average maturity  5.84 
Expected portfolio default rate  14.34% 
Standard deviation of expected portfolio default rate  4.12% 
 
Panel C:  Interest Waterfall 
Priority Payment 
1  First, taxes, filing, and registration fees; second, trustee fees; third, capped administrative expenses 
2  Hedge payments 
3  Senior management fees 
4  Class A interest 
5  Class A coverage tests.  If fail, pay down class A 
6  Class B interest.   
7  Class B coverage tests. If fail, pay down class A and then class B.  I 
8  Class B deferred interest 
9  Class C interest 
10  Class C coverage tests.  If fail, pay down class A, class B, and then class C. 
11  Class C deferred interest 
12  Class D interest 
13  Class D coverage tests.  If fail, pay down class A, class B, class C, and then class D. 
14  Class D deferred interest. 
15  During the reinvestment period, if class D overcollateralization test is not satisfied, deposit to 
collection account as principal until class D reinvestment O/C test is satisfied. 
16  Deposit to collection account as principal proceeds amount that principal proceeds were used to pay 
(1)-(4), (6), (8), (9), (11), (12), and (14) above. 
17  Subordinated hedge termination payment 
18  Payments due in clause 1 above the capped amount 
19  Subordinated management fee 
20  At the discretion of the collateral manager, with the consent of a majority of the preference shares, to 
deposit in the collection account as principal 
21  Preference shares up to an internal rate of return (IRR) of 14% 
22  If IRR is 14% or greater, 20% of remaining interest proceeds to the collateral manager as an incentive 
management fee and 80% of any remaining interest proceeds. 
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Panel D:  Principal Waterfall 
Priority Payment 
1  Items 1 to 14 in the interest waterfall   
2  If payment date is a redemption date, the redemption prices of all the notes and any preference shares 
to be redeemed.  If payment date requires a special redemption, pay sequentially A, then B then C then 
D, until each note is paid in full as required.  If payment date requires a partial redemption, pay pro 
rata to the class A, B, C, and D notes and the preference shares. 
3  During the reinvestment period to purchase additional collateral 
4  After the reinvestment period, pay down class A notes until paid in full 
5  After the reinvestment period, pay down class B notes until paid in full 
6  After the reinvestment period, pay down class C notes until paid in full 
7  After the reinvestment period, pay down class D notes until paid in full 
8  After the reinvestment period, to the payment of (17)-(19), (21) and (22) of the interest waterfall. 
 
 
Panel E: Expected Portfolio Characteristics 
  Expected On Effective Date  Required 
Weighted average spread (%)  3.125  2.750 
Weighted average coupon (%)  8.750  8.500 
 
 
Panel F:  Sale and Reinvestment of Collateral Restrictions 
The transaction structure permits the collateral manager to sell collateral debt securities under the 
following conditions: 
•  The collateral debt security is a defaulted security, a workout asset, or a current pay 
obligation 
•  The collateral debt security is an equity security 
•  The collateral debt security is deemed a credit risk security 
•  The collateral debt security is deemed a credit-improved security 
•  The collateral debt security is subject to withholding tax 
•  As a result of an optimal redemption 
•  As a result of a rating confirmation failure on the effective date 
 
The transaction also allows the collateral manager to sell collateral debt securities outside the 
requirements set forth above, if the total volume of these sales does not exceed 25% of the 
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Table 2:  Global CDO Issuance Volume ($mil) 
This table reproduces global CDO issuance statistics from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA).  Issuance is broken down by type of structure and by issuer motivation.  The original data is available at 
http://www.sifma.org/research/global-cdo.html 
 
    
BY TYPE: 
 








Market Value  Arbitrage  Balance Sh 
eet 
$  % $ % $ % $ % $  % 
2004  157,418 119,531 76  37,237  24  650  0  146,998 93  10,419 7 
2005  271,803 206,225 76  64,957  24  620  0  227,403 84  44,399 16 
2006  551,709 414,743 75  89,042  16  47,924  9  472,197 86  79,511 14 
2007  502,978 362,651 72  46,230  9 94,096  19  436,102 87  66,876 13 
2008 – 1H  36,807 26,190 71  1,212  3  9,404  26  28,855 78  7,951 22 
Total  1,520,715 1,183,340 74 238,678 16 152,694 10  1,311,555 86  209,156  14 
 

























2000  4  33  1,840  4 33  1,840  0 0 0 
2001  10  74 5,793  8  60 4,577  2  14 1,216 
2002  16  115  5,955  13 88 4,789  3  27 1,166 
2003  41  297 16,666  35  244 14,613  6  53  2,053 
2004  66  477 29,137  53  354 22,785  13  123 6,353 
2005  99  741 51,139  80  573 40,313  19  168 10,826 
2006  169  1,261  86,573  126 909 62,620  43  352 23,953 
2007*  126  922 74,521  86  622 47,943  40  300 26,579 
Total  531  3,920 271,624  405  2,883 199,479  126  1,037 72,145 
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Table 3: CDO and tranche size ($mil) 
 
Panel A 








Std Min Max 
2000 
 
460  401  414  519  102 400 612 
2001 
 
579  438  511  750  194 321 895 
2002 
 
372 307  397  432  72  250  482 
2003 
 
406  306  356  439  165 212 1,023 
2004 
 
441  354  408  500  162 200 1,107 
2005 
 
517  364  499  600  209 210 1,250 
2006 
 
512  400  467  544  254 286 3,000 
2007 
 




512  400  460  557  257 200 3,529 
 
Panel B 




56  15  23 37  90 1.2  365 
2001 
 
79 11  22  50  145  1.8  654 
2002 
 
54  8  17 34  90 2.0  381 
2003 
 
58  10  19 41  96 0.5  847 
2004 
 
63  12  24 45  99 0.1  633 
2005 
 
69 15  27  57  108  0.02  681 
2006 
 
69 18  29  53  106  1.0  1,080 
2007 
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Table 4: Par Value of Notes Issued by CDOs, by Rating (in $ mil) 
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CDOs with tranche: 
 
 






















AAA  530 100%  71.4  7.3  63.7  68.2 73.0  75.4 77.4 
                  
AA+  4 0.8%  5.4  2.7  2.6  3.3  5.1 7.5  8.9 
AA  427 80%  6.5  3.8  3.7  4.7  6.0  7.7  9.1 
AA-  9 2%  11.5  4.8  5.6  8.5  10.1  14.0  10.6 
                  
A+  17 3%  5.4  2.6  2.4  3.2 5  6.8 9 
A  425 80%  6.3  3.8  4.5  5  5.8  6.6  8.4 
A-  65 12%  6.6  2.2  4.4  4.9 6.7  8.5 9.1 
                  
BBB+  8 2%  3.3  3.4  0  1.3  2.2 4.2  10.9 
BBB  411 77%  5  1.7  3.3  3.9  4.6  5.8  7.1 
BBB-  97 18%  5.2  2  2.6  4.1 5.5  6.3 7 
                  
BB+  9 2%  1.4  1.1  0  0.6  1.6 2.5  3.1 
BB  304 57%  3.2  0.9  2.1  2.7  3.2  3.8  4.3 
BB-  69 13%  3.8  1.5  2.3  3.0 3.8  4.3 5.2 
                  
B+  0 0%             
B  10 2%  1.8  0.3  1.4  1.7 1.9  2  2.2 
B-  3 0.6%  1.1  0.6  0.5  0.5  1  1.8  1.8 
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Table 6:  Uniformity of Deal Structures 
This table summarizes the liability structures observed for CLOs in our sample.  Panel A shows that most CLOs 
have one of four combinations of rated tranches.  Panel B examines whether liability structure is correlated with  
underlying collateral quality.   
 
 






Contains tranches rated: 
 
Type 1  209  40%  AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, NR 
Type 2  69  13%  AAA, AA, A, BBB, NR 
Type 3  38  7%  AAA, AA, A, BBB- , BB- , NR  
Type 4  20  4%  AAA, A, BBB, BB, NR 
Other*  197 37%   
All CDOs  531  100%   
*Each structure in this category appears less frequently than Type 4 Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
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Table 6, continued 
Panel B:  Asset & liability structures of four major deal types 
Collateral quality frequency (when available) 
  Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  Type 4 
BBB-  1    
BB+  1    
BB  1    
BB-  8 5  2 
B+  153 49 19 18 
B  38 10  18   
B-  5 3    
Total 207  67  37  20 
Liabilities:   Rated tranches as % of deal par 
  Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  Type 4 
% AAA        
Median 73.1  74.3  66.8  76.1 
Mean 71.9  70.1  66.7  75.6 
SD 4.2  10.8  3.5  2.2 
% NR        
Median 8  9.3  10  8.4 
Mean 8.6  11.9  10  9.1 
SD 2.2  9.9  1.1  1.9 
% AA         
Median 5.7  5.1  8   
Mean 6  5.5  7.8   
SD 1.9  2.2  1.5   
%A        
Median 5.4  5.7  6  8.2 
Mean 5.6  6.2  5.9  8.1 
SD 1.2  2.3  1.1  1.4 
%BBB        
Median 4.3  6.3    4.3 
Mean 4.6  6.3    4.1 
SD 1.3  1.7    0.8 
%BBB-        
Median     6   
Mean     6   
SD     0.9   
%BB        
Median 3.2      3.1 
Mean 3.3      3.2 
SD 0.9      0.5 
%BB-        
Median     3.6   
Mean     3.6   
SD     1.0   
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Table 7: Collateral Restrictions 
This table examines the frequency of collateral restrictions across CLOs, and the value of the restriction conditional 
on observing it.  Most CLOs are revolving pools where the manager can turnover a fraction of assets each year, but 
the portfolio composition is governed by collateral restrictions decided upon at the time of issuance. 
  CDOs with 
restriction 
Conditional Distribution Statistics 












MIN senior secured loans  355  67%  86.8  7.4  80  85  90  90  95 
MIN senior loans  58  11%  84.3  10.1  75  80  85  90  95 
MAX second lien loans  244  46%  11.7  10.1  5  10  10  12.5  15 
MAX high-yield bonds  144  27%  6.9  4.4  5  5  5  10  15 
MAX corp. bonds  25  5%  7.7  5.5  5  5  5  10  10 
MAX structured fin securities  307  58%  5.1  3.9  3  3  5  5  7.5 
Near default securities: 
MAX current pay  223  42%  6.0  2.2  5  5  5  7.5  7.5 
MAX rated CCC+ or lower  309  58%  8.9  9.5  5  5  7.5  7.5  15 
MAX debtor-in-possession loans  359  68%  6.7  3.5  5  5  5  7.5  10 
MAX discounted obligations  115  22%  7.0  2.4  5  5  7.5  8  10 
MAX obt. in bankruptcy exch.  14  3%  4.1  2.3  2  2  5  5  5 
Collateral interest type: 
MIN floating rate  197  37%  92.8  8.1  85  90  95  95  100 
MAX fixed rate  322  61%  8.1  9.4  3  5  5  8  15 
Payment frequency of  collateral:
MAX paying less than quarterly  275  52%  9.1  5.1  5  5  10  10  15 
MAX paying less than 
semiannual. 
158 30%  6.3  3.6  5  5  5  5  10 
MAX pay-in-kind  254  48%  5.3  3.6  2.5  5  5  5  5 
MAX zero coupon  164  31%  4.2  1.5  2  2.5  5  5  5 
MAX maturing after CDO  242  46%  2.6  1.3  2  2  2.5  3  4 
Diversification: 
MAX conc. in single issuer  356  67%  2.2  1.0  1.5  1.6  2  2.5  3 
MAX conc. in top 3 issuers, each  36  7%  2.9  1.2  2  2  2.5  3  5 
MAX conc. in single industry  133  25%  8.9  2.2  8  8  8  8  10 
MAX conc. in top 2 ind., each  37  7%  11.6  4.2  10  10  10  12  14 
MAX conc. in top 3 ind., each  54  10%  13.0  7.3  10  10  12  12  12 
Domicile of obligors: 
MAX  non-US  257  63%  16.9  5.0 10 15  20  20 25 
MAX non-US/UK/Canada  62  15%  10.5  6.3  3  5  10  15  17.5 
Currency of obligations: 
MAX non-US dollar   21  5%  6.4  6.4  0  0  5  10  15 
MAX non-Euro  111  88%  28.0  10.2  19.5  25  30  30  35 
Rated by: 
MIN rated by S&P  19  4%  86.1  9.5  80  85  90  90  90 
MAX rated by other agency  37  7%  10.0  2.4  10  10  10  10  10 
  
 Benmelech and Dlugosz: The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings 
  41
Table 8:  Level of portfolio defaults that rated tranches must/can withstand in rating 
agency simulation model 
Scenario default rate = level of portfolio defaults that a tranche should be able to withstand (paying timely interest 
and ultimate principal by maturity) in cash-flow simulations; it is equal to the level of defaults in the collateral pool 
that has no greater than x% chance of being exceeded, where x% is the historical default rate on a corporate bond of 
the same rating and maturity as the tranche in question.  Break-even default rate = level of portfolio defaults that a 
tranche can withstand, according to underwriter cash-flow simulations  
 
   Scenario Default Rate  Breakeven Default Rate 
Rating N(tranches) N  Mean SD  P25 Median P75 N  Mean SD  P25 Median P75 
                      
AAA  1,082  903 44.1  9.1  37.1 40.6  51.9 762 51.9  11.7 43.2 48.5  59.2 
                      
AA+  4  3  43.4  12.4 30.8 44.0  55.5 3  48.1  12.6 36.5 46.3  61.5 
AA  458  403 40.5  9.3  32.8 36.9  49.0 333 47.1  10.5 39.3 43.5  55.0 
AA-  13  10  32.5 4.1  27.7  32.5  36.0  3  41.0 6.0  34.0  44.5  44.5 
                      
A+  21  21 29.6  3.1 27.4  29.6  31.4  18 36.3  6.0 31.1  36.0  40.0 
A  472  418 36.0  9.4  28.9 32.0  45.1 361 39.6  9.5  32.9 35.7  47.7 
A-  83  74 30.4  6.6 26.3  29.1  32.2  48 33.4  5.6 29.5  31.4  35.6 
                      
BBB+  10  6 29.0  7.0  23.3  28.1  28.9  6 33.5  7.5  29.4  29.4  36.0 
BBB  507  448 29.4  8.3  24.3 26.2  32.5 402 31.9  8.8  26.4 28.2  35.7 
BBB-  108  88 31.7  7.8 25.4  30.5  35.1  44 32.8  8.7 26.8  28.3  40.4 
                      
BB+  12  6 22.1  2.8  20.7  22.0  23  4 28.3  2.4  26.8  28.1  29.9 
BB  345  307 24.3  8.5  18.5 20.3  27.2 278 27.9  8.3  22.3 24.1  34.7 
BB-  82  59 26.9  8.7 20.4  24.2  37.0  12 29.4  8.5 22.8  27.1  34.8 
                      
B+  0                     
B  10  5 28.7  8.4  20.7  34.2  34.9  3 29.5  7.0  21.8  31.1  35.6 
B-  3  3 22.0  9.4  16.0  17.1  32.9  3 30.4  9.6  24.7  24.9  41.5 
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Table 9: Collateral Performance 
This table summarizes the portfolio allocation of all CLOs rated by S&P that were outstanding as of 
 January 2009.  
 
 















Allocation as of: 
Portfolio 
Allocation as of: 
Portfolio 
Allocation as of: 
Portfolio 
Allocation as of: 
Portfolio 
Allocation as of: 





















%AAA  0.00  0.07 0.07 0.00  0.06 0.06 0.01  0.06 0.05 0.01  0.03 0.02 0.00  0.07 0.07 
%AA  0.02  0.20 0.18 0.07  0.13 0.06 0.08  0.18 0.10 0.13  0.19 0.06 0.03  0.14 0.11 
%A  0.41  0.64 0.23 0.19  0.54 0.35 0.35  0.64 0.29 0.18  0.44 0.26 0.05  0.23 0.18 
%BBB  2.25  2.97 0.72 1.80  2.50 0.70 1.42  2.46 1.04 1.52  2.40 0.88 1.14  2.32 1.18 
%BB  20.2 18.1 -2.11 22.8 19.9 -2.87 23.0 19.9 -3.11 22.7 20.7 -2.02 20.9 18.8 -2.08 
%B  70.6 68.8 -1.79 69.1 66.3 -2.78 69.2 66.7 -2.64 65.2 63.7 -1.57 67.4 64.6 -2.79 
%CCC  5.78  6.60 0.82 5.13  7.97 2.84 5.02  7.41 2.39 8.51  9.40 0.89 7.92  10.8 2.83 
%CC  0.06  0.80 0.74 0.14  0.56 0.42 0.11  0.56 0.45 0.36  0.44 0.08 0.32  0.38 0.06 
%D  0.72  1.88 1.16 0.73  1.95 1.22 0.68  2.11 1.43 1.29  2.67 1.38 2.30  2.73 0.43 
 
Total 
 
100 
 
100 
  
100 
 
100 
  
100 
 
100 
  
100 
 
100 
  
100 
 
100 
 
 